Iaea Safeguards Agreement India

India has also signed an agreement with Kazakhstan on the supply of uranium and is considering a pact with Canada for the resumption of nuclear trade. In the future, additional reactors will be covered by the IAEA safeguard mechanisms under the newly signed agreement. In accordance with Point 11, nuclear facilities and materials are part of the purpose of this agreement. Conclusion: The new Indian IAEA Protection Agreement does not allow India to remove, for any reason, protected nuclear materials or facilities from security measures, legally and unilaterally. Safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities can only be lifted in accordance with the conditions set out in Section E of the proposed India-IAEA safeguard agreement. India currently controls the IAEA in six civilian nuclear reactors under safeguard agreements concluded between 1971 and 1994. Members of the IAEA Board of Directors should object to such an interpretation, which is contrary to the articles of the agreement that define the reasons for the cessation or suspension of safeguards. It would also be contrary to the principle that nuclear materials and facilities subject to IAEA protection agreements should remain under permanent protection. If India does not publicly acknowledge that protective facilities and materials should not be unilaterally removed from security measures, the IAEA Council should amend the proposed agreement to ensure that this is a clear and common interpretation of the agreement. Indeed, unilateral cessation of security measures under the Agency`s security system is not permitted and unilateral cessation by India is expressly provided for in the operational sections of the proposed agreement on the cessation of India-IAEA measures.

In October 2009, India presented a separation plan to place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA protection until 2014. [46] In late July 2010, India and the United States signed a bilateral agreement that allowed India to replenish U.S.-bound nuclear materials in two new reprocessing facilities to be built and placed under the IAEA`s control. [47] However, the nuclear industry did not grow as expected, as India`s laws on liability for civilian nuclear power plants far exceeded international nuclear liability standards and suppliers were legally responsible for the damage caused by accidents. In 2016, India ratified the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage to address these concerns and give impetus to the nuclear industry. [48] The agreement on safeguards between India and India, submitted to the Board of Directors, contains several ambiguities and raises a number of fundamental issues. Members of the IAEA Board of Directors should reject interpretations of the agreement that violate the principle that nuclear materials and facilities subject to IAEA protection agreements should remain permanently protected. Finally, there is no reason for the Governing Council to havetily vote on this draft safeguard agreement, given its considerable impact. Addressing the Board of Directors, Dr ElBaradei said the IAEA would begin implementing the new safeguard agreement in 2009, with the aim of placing 14 Indian reactors under agency guarantees by 2014. The IAEA is currently implementing safeguards for six Indian nuclear reactors under safeguard agreements concluded between 1971 and 1994.

If India considers that it can unilaterally withdraw from the safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities that are the subject of the proposed agreement on the IAEA safeguard measures, the IAEA Council should amend the proposed agreement to ensure that there is no doubt that the end of these safeguard measures must be a common IAEA-India provision.

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